The main purpose of this project is to give an overview of the liquidity and activity in the secondary market for Norwegian debt securities. The second objective is to determine whether the activity and data availability is sufficient to be able construct indicators that can be used to monitor the state of Norwegian bond market on a regular basis. To this end we examine a detailed data set provided to us by Oslo Børs Informasjon (OBI) containing the complete record of daily trading activity in all exchange listed fixed income securities in Norway over the period 1999-2011. Due to the low trading activity in corporate securities and the fact that a large part of trading in corporate debt securities is conducted off market (OTC), makes it challenging to produce reliable liquidity indicators. In particular, orderbased liquidity measures (such as the bid ask spread), that typically are superior measures of liquidity supply, are in most cases not possible to construct due to the lack of two sided quote observations. On the other hand, due to the reporting rules of all OTC trades to the Oslo Stock Exchange, trade-based measures of liquidity (such as the Amihud ILR) are more informative.
Introduction
In this report we examine the liquidity in the Norwegian market for debt securities, tradable fixed income securities issued by Norwegian Corporations and Government. Norwegian corporations issue debt securities either locally, in the Norwegian market, in which case the securities are listed and traded at the Oslo Stock Exchange, or internationally. Internationally issued securities will typically be issued in USD or Euro. Government and other agency issues will typically be targeted at the domestic market. In this report we concentrate on the domestic market, and investigate the activity and liquidity in the secondary market for debt securities. 1 The liquidity of the domestic debt securities market is of interest to Norges Bank for various reasons. Surveillance of liquidity risk of Norwegian banks is part of Norges Banks work on promoting Financial Stability. The liquidity of the Norwegian debt securities market influences both the asset and liability side of Norwegian banks. Over the recent years, wholesale funding has become an important funding source for Norwegian banks, and especially for medium sized and smaller savings banks, the domestic market is an important long-and medium term funding market. On the asset side, the liquidity of Norwegian bonds is important when assessing the quality of their portfolio of liquid assets. Moreover, from 2015 the Basel III quantitative liquidity requirements are to be put in place for Norwegian banks through CRD IV. Inclusion of NOK denominated bonds in the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is to some extent dependent on the secondary market liquidity of such bonds. Lastly, the liquidity of Norwegian government bonds is important when judging the sufficiency of yields of such bonds as benchmarks for long term interest rates.
Issuance of Debt Securities in Norway
The domestic bond issuance is small compared to the debt securities markets in the large European countries like Germany, France and UK, see Norwegian corporate firms and financial institutions also issue debt in international markets. By end of Q3 2011 the outstanding amount of Norwegian debt securities in international markets was the equivalent of 241 billion USD, of which financial institutions constituted to approximately 85 per cent. Also for Swedish issuers the outstanding amount in the international market equals the outstanding amount in the domestic market, while domestic issuance dominates in Denmark (Figure 1 ). In the UK the outstanding amount of internationally issued debt securities is more than twice as large as the outstanding domestic amount.
Norwegian Government bonds and treasury bills amounted to 83,8 billion USD or approximately 35 per cent of the total outstanding amount of domestic debt securities in Q3 2011.
1 By the domestic debt securities market we will understand issues by residents in domestic currency targeted at resident investors, is defined in BIS (2012) .
2 Domestic see BIS (2012) : Quarterly Review. 
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Norway has no Government debt issued in international markets, i.e. no Government debt issued in other currencies than NOK. According to BIS (2012) all the other European countries issue
Government debt in international markets, but the outstanding domestic amount is larger. The share of Government debt in the domestic market in Norway is larger than in Sweden and Denmark, but less than in France, Germany and UK, see Issuance by Norwegian corporate companies is of limited scale compared to financial institutions both in the domestic and international debt securities markets. By the end of Q3 2011 it amounts to just above 11 per cent of the outstanding domestic debt.
The Bond Market on Oslo Stock Exchange
The Norwegian domestic debt securities market corresponds to the bonds, notes and other debt instruments listed on Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) and Alternative Bond Market (ABM). and small companies making use of the simplified listing and reporting requirements.
Development in market structure
In 1988 Oslo Stock Exchange introduced an electronic trading system for stocks and derivatives, and from October 1989 this system was also launched for bond trading. The electronic trading system opened up for decentralized trading, in the sense that brokers could trade from office terminals linked to the system.
Ten years later, in September 1999, a new decentralized trading platform (ASTS) was introduced, making it possible with direct routing of orders via brokers to the trading system.
For trading in government bonds, launching of the system entailed a change from indicative prices to automatic matching of orders. Automatching amounted to about 20-30 per cent of the trades in government bonds in the first years after the system was introduced, but this share has fallen to approximately 10-15 per cent.
Automatching was not introduced for trading in non-government bonds, which continued being phone-based. However, all trades in non-government bonds were to be reported to the stock exchange within 5 minutes after the trade had taken place, but with a possible application for delayed publication until the end of the day.
Since September 1999 the Oslo Stock Exchange has changed its trading system twice, but the main characteristics, including decentralized trading and automatching of bonds, are the same.
In There is currently also an ongoing transition to a new trading system which is expected to be finalized in the fourth quarter 2012. This migration is when the Oslo Stock Exchange will migrate to the Millennium platform
Literature and liquidity measures
In this section we will provide an explanation of how one typically defines market liquidity in the literature, and give a brief overview of some recent papers that examine the role of liquidity in fixed-income markets. We also address some challenges with respect to sampling frequency and precision of liquidity measures and how that affect this analysis.
Defining market liquidity
Liquidity is a broad concept that is difficult to define precisely. At a very general level, a liquid market is characterized by the ability to transact a given volume quickly at a low cost and with a small, and short lived (i.e. temporary 3 ) price impact. In addition, a liquid market is characterized by a quick replenishment of liquidity and convergence to the equilibrium price after a trade. However, we need to be more precise when attempting to measure liquidity.
Initially, one would want a measure of liquidity that says something about the expected 3 Price movements associated with trades can generally be decomposed into a temporary and permanent movements. The permanent price movements reflect price discovery as new information enters the price through trades. The temporary price movements are due to liquidity trades that temporary dislocate the price from equilibrium. In a liquid market, this dislocation is quickly reverted as liquidity suppliers replenish the order book, while in an illiquid market, the temporary price dislocation lasts longer before prices revert to equilibrium. cost of trading for the random investor's point of view. However, as will be discussed further below, the cost of taking (demanding) liquidity is a function of the characteristics and needs of the trader. For example, an impatient trader with a need to sell quickly is likely to incur a much higher cost of trading compared to a patient trader with the same selling need. Typically, the patient trader will submit limit orders (supplying liquidity), while the impatient trader will submit market orders (taking liquidity). A limit order to e.g. buy is a resting order to buy a specified volume for a specific maximum price ("limit"). A market order is an order to buy a specified volume of an issue without a limit price, which means that the order will execute at increasingly worse prices ("walk the book") until fully filled. An alternative to pure market orders are so-called marketable limit orders. Marketable limit orders are simply aggressively priced limit orders (e.g. to buy) that match (and hence immediately execute) against the best priced limit order (e.g. to sell) of the opposite side. If the marketable limit order is partially filled, the remaining part of the order will typically automatically be converted to a regular limit order at the limit price. 4 Hence, regular limit order to buy or sell constitute liquidity supply, while market orders and marketable limit orders constitute liquidity demand.
As a useful starting point, Harris (1990) argues that liquidity can be defined along four dimensions; width, depth, immediacy and resiliency. These dimensions are interrelated, and most liquidity measures used in the literature typically capture several dimensions at once. On the other hand, no single measure is able to accurately capture all sides of liquidity, so typically one have to look at several measures, or extract common factors from a set of measures, to get a good picture (see e.g. Chollete, Naes, and Skjeltorp (2008) for an analysis of common factors in a set of stock market liquidity proxies). Before we go into the specific measures that we will look at in this study, it is useful to describe the liquidity dimensions proposed by Harris (1990) in more detail. For this purpose, it is useful to have a reference point. Figure 3 provides such a reference point by showing a general example of a limit order book (i.e. liquidity supply) at one point in time for one security.
It is important to note that while both of the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) trading platforms (Saxess until April 2010 and TradElect for the rest of the sample period) has been organized as an continuous electronic limit order market 5 as depicted by the figure, a public limit order book is not a complete description of the Norwegian bond market due to the large fraction of trading that occurs outside the exchange system (over the counter ). For government securities, there are designated primary dealers that are required to post bid and ask quotes in government securities, such that the bid and ask spread will typically be available through the trading day.
For corporate securities on the other hand, there are no such designated market makers that are 4 There are typically three types of order instruction sets; execution based, time based and period based instructions. Two standard execution based order instructions are; "execute and eliminate" (ENE) where the unexecuted part of the order will be canceled, and the "fill or kill" (FOK) instruction in which the order will be immediately canceled unless fully filled. The two standard time based instructions are; "Good till canceled" and "Good till time" orders which are similar to the ENE, but with an additional time limit for which the remaining part of the order will reside in the order book. The period based instructions include, "At the close", "At the open", "Good for auction" and "Good for day" instructions.
5 A detailed technical specification of the Fixed Income market model is found at http://www.oslobors.no/ Oslo-Boers/Handel/Handelssystemer/TradElect/Markedsmodell required to quote continuous bid and ask prices. All off market transactions are required to be reported to the OSE immediately or by the end of the trading day. Despite the fact that a large fraction of trading occurs off market, for the purpose of conceptualizing liquidity supply and explain the implicit costs components associated with demanding liquidity, the picture figure 3 is useful. While it mainly illustrates how the liquidity supply in an automatic limit order market works, it can more broadly be thought of as reflecting the aggregate liquidity supply both off-and on-exchange at various price levels. On the horizontal axis we have the prices at which investors are willing to provide liquidity, i.e. are willing to buy (bid) and sell (ask). The y-axis reflect the accumulated volume at the respective price levels in the limit order book.
The fixed income market at OSE is structured in several layers where a set of segments defines the trading model for the tradeable instruments. Appendix B contains a more detailed overview of the market structure implemented in TradElect. For the automated continuous auction system, the regular limit orders submitted to the TradElect system is stored and displayed in the order book with full volume. Note that the OB Automatch (OBAU) segment is the only part of the OSE fixed income market where there is continuous trading. Only government bonds have automatch trading on OSE. Once a marketable order is entered into the system, TradElect automatically generates a trade and the details are disseminated to market participants through the InfoLect data feed system. The system also allows the submission of iceberg orders, which are partially visible limit orders. 6 All trades executed away from the order book (manual trades) must be reported via TradElect within five minutes 7 .
Width Width reflects the cost of supplying liquidity (i.e. posting limit orders) versus demanding liquidity (posting market orders). 8 For example, in figure 3, a patient buyer could post a limit order at p 1 b and wait for an impatient to submit a marketable limit order or market order 9 . From the perspective of an impatient buyer, she would demand liquidity by posting a marketable limit order at p 1 a (or a market order to buy) which would immediately execute. The difference between the price that the patient buyer would pay (p 1 b ) and what the impatient buyer would pay (p 1 a ) reflects the implicit cost per share for trading immediately. A more liquid security has typically a tighter spread (smaller width). Hence, width measures how much an investor needs to increase (decrease) the price to obtain immediate execution. There is a large theoretical literature that shows the existence of a positive spread in equilibrium. These models suggest that the spread reflect a compensation to the liquidity supplier for e.g. adverse selection 6 Iceberg orders are order instructions where e.g. 10% of the order is visible in the limit order book. Once the visible part is executed, a new fraction of the order is automatically entered into the market. The new order looses time priority, and is considered as a new submission of a regular limit order.
7 However, by request to the exchange trades can also be allowed to be reported with a longer delay, typically by the end of the trading day.
8 A limit order is an order with a fixed price and volume, while a market order is an order to buy a specific volume at the best available prices. Hence, a limit order is a passive orders that executed when a market order is submitted.
9 The difference between a market order and marketable limit order is that a market order instruction only specifies volume and direction without a specific price and will execute at the best available price(s) in the market. Hence, a large market order might execute across several price levels of the order book. A marketable limit order on will execute only up to a specified price point (limit).
Figure 3 Example of a limit order book
The figure illustrates the limit order book (liquidity supply) at a particular point in time for one security. The horizontal axis shows the quoted prices, where the subscript b and a denote bid and ask quotes, respectively, while the superscript denotes the level of the limit order book relative to the side, and p * is the bid/ask midpoint price, which reflect the instantaneous "true" value of the security. The vertical axes show the accumulated depth on the bid (left axis) and ask (right axis) sides.
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risk, and costs associated with holding inventory and order-handling (see e.g. O'Hara (1995) for an overview of these models).
Depth While width measure the cost of demanding one unit of liquidity, it does not reflect how much liquidity is available at the various price levels. If an investor needs to buy (sell) a large volume quickly, the depth available at the various ask (bid) levels is important for the volume weighted average execution price that she will obtain. Typically, the prices at the best quotes (p 1 b and p 1 a ) are unlikely to be representative for a large trader, especially if the order book is dispersed. Looking at figure 3, an impatient buyer that needs to buy a volume equal to v a4 would have to pay an average price that is higher ("walk the book") than a trader that needs a volume less or equal to v a1 . In addition, comparing the depth of the bid and ask sides we see that a seller would need to change his price less (relative to the best bid) to sell a similar volume as our buyer (relative to the best ask) indicated by the horizontal arrows.
Immediacy Another important aspect of liquidity is how quickly one can find opposite side trading interest. This is generally not a problem in a market with an intermediary standing between the buyers and sellers (i.e. a market makers/dealers). However, in a pure limit order market without any intermediaries, the arrival of buyers and sellers might not always be synchronized in time. In a liquid market, the number of buyers and sellers supplying liquidity is typically greater than in an illiquid market, which reduces the time needed for a patient trader to fill an order at a reasonable cost. For equities, in 2004, the OSE allowed listed firms to contract with so-called Designated Market Makers (DMMs) to improve the secondary market liquidity of their issued shares. DMMs charge a fee to the firm that has issued the equity to provide liquidity in the the firm's stock through limit orders. See Skjeltorp and Ødegaard (2010) for more details and an empirical analysis of the impact of DMMs on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
Resiliency The fourth dimension proposed by Harris(1990) is resiliency. This dimension is notoriously difficult to measure, but captures a very important aspect of secondary market liquidity. The resiliency of the market reflect how quickly the liquidity supply is replenished and the price moves back to equilibrium after a large uninformed liquidity demand has been filled. In figure 3 , if the aggressive buy order we looked at earlier takes out the depth of the first four levels of the ask side, resiliency reflect how long it takes before competitive liquidity suppliers come in and reduce the to spread and depth to its pre-trade level. This dynamics is modeled theoretically in a recent paper by Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2012) , where they show that the resiliency is a function of liquidity suppliers ("makers") monitoring intensity, the fee structure at the trading venue and the fraction of liquidity suppliers.
Trade-versus order-based measures For empirical purposes it is also useful to distinguish between trade-based and order-based measures of liquidity. Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2003) define measures that capture liquidity supply directly (depth, bid/ask spread etc) as order based measures, while measures that look at realized transactions (e.g. trading volume, number of trades, trade size etc) are defined as trade based measures. The main distinction between the two comes from the fact that order based measures are closer to ex-ante measures of liquidity provision while trade based measures only reflect the consumed liquidity. While the two are cross-sectionally related, the results in Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2003) show that measures from the two categories have a low time-series correlation. More importantly, they show that trade-based measures have a tendency to signal favorable liquidity conditions also during periods of stress, even though implicit costs of trading is high. Based on this, they argue that orderbased measures are superior proxies for liquidity as such measures more accurately reflect the true costs of obtaining liquidity in periods of stress. They advocate a combination of the bid/ask spread, order-book depth and the probability of order execution to measure liquidity.
Notably, their measures are closely linked to the three first dimensions proposed by Harris (1990) ; i.e. width, depth and immediacy.
Recent studies on bond market liquidity
It is now widely recognized that the liquidity is important for the pricing of securities. With respect to fixed income securities, there is a large number of studies that document a liquidity premium. For example, Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) find that liquidity is priced in corporate yield spreads. Using a set of several liquidity measures they find that more illiquid bonds earn significantly higher yield spreads, and that an improvement in liquidity causes a significant reduction in yield spreads. These results hold after controlling for common bond-specific, firmspecific characteristics, and macroeconomic variables. Also, in a recent paper, Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) establish a strong link between bond liquidity and bond prices, both in aggregate and in the cross-section. that the illiquidity in corporate bonds is substantial, significantly greater than what can be explained by bid-ask spreads. More specifically, they establish a strong link between bond illiquidity and bond prices. In aggregate, changes in market-level illiquidity explain a substantial part of the time variation in yield spreads of high-rated (AAA through A) bonds, overshadowing the credit risk component. In the cross-section, the bond-level illiquidity measure explains individual bond yield spreads with large economic significance.
For treasury bonds, Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2011) examine the liquidity of the US treasury market across different maturities and the bonds on-or off-the-run status. 10 They measure liquidity by the relative quoted spread and find that liquidity worsens in recessions across all maturities, but that this effect is most pronounced for short-term bonds. They argue that this suggest that investors shift into short-term bonds during recessions. 11 They also find that the more illiquid off-the-run bonds are more sensitive to shocks to inflation and monetary policy surprises than their more liquid on-the-run counterparts, and use this to identify a significant liquidity risk premium in the treasury market. Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) also show that there is a strong relationship between stock and bond Treasury bond market liquidity, with a two way causality relation, consistent with flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity episodes. A recent paper by Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009) examine detailed data from the Euro-area government bond market to study to what degree investors value credit quality and liquidity. Their main result is that there is a negative correlation between credit quality and liquidity, and that cross-sectional variation in sovereign yield spreads is mainly explained by differences in credit quality. However, they also show that liquidity plays an important role especially for low credit risk countries and during times of heightened market uncertainty.
The market based liquidity measures we calculate in this study are similar to those examined in the above mentioned studies, although we will not examine the pricing implications of liquidity in the Norwegian bond market.
Data and measures

Description of data
The analysis in this paper is based on daily data for all listed securities at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) for the period 1980-2011. We restrict, however, the sample period to the period after trading in fixed income securities was organized as a fully automated electronic order book system; i.e. from 1999 through 2011. The main reason for this is that market organization/design and trading rules can have significant effects on price formation and liq-uidity provision. Hence, we choose a sample period that is relatively stable with respect to the underlying market structure through the sample which is also more representative going forward.
The main dataset is obtained from Oslo Børs Informasjon (OBI) on special order (see Appendix D for a list of the variables available in the feed.). To supplement the market data, we also combine the OBI data with the Stamdata database, 12 which contains information on the terms and characteristics of each individual issue, as well as the complete history of repayments of the individual loans. These data will mainly be used to split the OBI data into subgroups, and to handle the outstanding volume when calculating turnover.
The calculation of order-based liquidity measures for the Norwegian fixed income market is complicated by the fact that a large amount of liquidity provision is off-exchange ("over-thecounter"). However, since all trades are required to be reported to the exchange trade-based measures will probably be more representative. As briefly discussed earlier, and detailed in Appendix B, the fixed income market is defined through various segments. The most relevant segments for this study are the Automatch segment (OBAU), the Call segment (OBOC) and the ABM segment (OABM). Only government securities are traded in the continuous automatch segment (OBAU). The OBI data includes all standard and non-standard repurchase agreement trades (REPO), which we are unable to separate from other trades. The trading of corporate issues is in the opening auction and close auction (OBOC) segment. In between the opening and close auctions, this segment is subject to order entering and manual trade reports. In addition, a large number of corporate issues are listed at the Oslo ABM which is defined as the OABM segment. As opposed to the OBOC segment, OABM does not have an opening or closing auction. Similar to the OBOC segment, OABM is subject to order entering and manual trade reports; i.e. no automatch.
All trades that occur within each segment is classified into various types. These are shown in Appendix C. There are two main types of trades; automatic trades and manual trades. With respect to the automatic trades, when orders are executed by TradElect, trades are automatically created, trade details are disseminated to the involved parties, and public information is published in InfoLect. With respect to the manual trades, these are trades that execute away from the order book and is reported manually into the system. Unfortunately, the OBI data does not separate directly between the different trade types. Hence, our measures will contain a mix of the various trade types.
Measures examined in this study
The range of measures we will focus on for the Norwegian fixed income market is limited due to the low activity, the large fraction of trading that occurs off-exchange and the lack of market indices for corporate issues. 13 We will construct measures of two types and use the distinction proposed by Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2003) between trade-based and order-based measures.
However, most of the measures will fall into the trade-based category due to the large part of trading that occurs off-exchange in the Norwegian fixed income market. Due to the rule that all off-market transactions needs to be reported to the exchange on a daily basis, our data contains the complete history of trades. With respect to order based measures, the OBI data also contains bid/ask quotes, although there for most securities are very few two sided quote observations. Hence, with respect to the dimensions proposed by Harris (1990) discussed above, we will only be able to calculate measures that proxy width and depth.
Trade based measures
Activity measures A natural starting point for our analysis is to examine the trading activity in the listed securities. We will measure the average number of days (during a quarter) that the issues are traded, to get an overall measure of trading intensity, the total NOK trading volume, average volume and turnover (transacted volume relative to outstanding volume of the loan at any point in time). 14 Trading activity can be high both in normal periods as well as during turbulent periods (Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2003) ), which means that trading activity by itself is not necessarily a good measure of aggregate liquidity variation. However, in the cross section, securities with high trading activity are typically more liquid (i.e. have lower implicit transaction costs).
Price impact measure (depth) As our main trade based liquidity measure we use Amihud (2002) 's ILR measure. ILR is a measure of the elasticity dimension of liquidity and is the most broadly applied measure of illiquidity in the literature due to its modest data requirements.
As an elasticity measures of liquidity it measures how much the price moves as a response to trading volume. Kyle (1985) defines price impact as the response of price to order flow, and the Amihud ILR measure is essentially an empirical version of Kyle's lambda. The daily Amihud measure is calculated as,
where D T is the number of trading days within a given time window T , |R i,t | is the absolute return over period t for security i, and V OL i,t is the trading volume (in units of currency, which is NOK in our case) over period t. It is standard to scale the estimate up by 10 6 for practical 13 We have however produced a large electronic document examining a much broader set of measures and also splitting the sample into notes and bonds. This document can be obtained upon request to the authors.
14 As can be seen in Appendix D the raw data feed also splits trading volume into "official-" and "non-official" volume. During the Saxess period (until April 2010) the official volume field contained a mix of various trade types (repos, reported trades etc.), while this was changed when the TradElect system was introduced from April 2010. During the TradElect period the official volume field was changed to only include automatched trades, uncrossed trades, regular trades that is immediately disseminated and regular trades with delayed reporting. Since we are unable to split the official and non-official volume into finer sub-categories (in particular during the Saxess period), we dismiss these volume variables in the analysis and only look at total volume. purposes. The Amihud measure is referred to as an illiquidity measure since a high estimate indicates low liquidity (high price impact of trades). Thus, the ILR measure captures how much the price moves for each volume unit of trades. Relative to Figure 3 , a low ILR estimate would indicate that there is a large depth in the limit order book that would reduce the average price impact, while a high ILR estimate is an indication that the liquidity supply is low causing prices to move more in response to liquidity demand.
Order based measures
Relative bid/ask spread As for equity market liquidity, different versions of the bid/ask spread is a commonly used measure of width. The relative bid ask spread is calculated as,
where p a t and p b t are the best ask and bid quotes respectively, and p m t is the quote midpoint measured as p m t = (p a t + p b t )/2. For direct measurement of the spread, two sided quotes at the same point in time is needed. However, in the Norwegian case a large number of observations only have quotes on one side of the market, and in most cases we do not have any quotes.
Other spread measures There are also several methods that can be applied to estimate implicit spread measures that does not require quote observations. Two widely used estimators are those proposed by Roll (1984) and Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) LOT measure uses the zero return days of individual stocks relative to overall market returns to estimate an implicit trading cost. More specifically, the LOT cost is an estimate of the implicit cost required for the price not to move when the market as a whole moves, and Lesmond et al. (1999) shows that their estimator is closely related to both the level and variation in the bid ask spread. However, since the LOT measure requires a broad market index to be estimated, the lack of a long and broad corporate bond market index for Norway, makes the estimation not feasible. We have also tried to estimate the Roll measure for Norwegian issues, however, the low number of transaction prices for individual issues that is not too distant in time makes the Roll measure very noisy, and in many cases negative. Due to these problems, we have left both the LOT and Roll results out of the analysis.
Groups of issuers and characteristics
We focus on constructing liquidity and activity measures for subgroups of issuers. However, one major problem with the data is that there is a significant amount of missing observations for a large number of issues due to lack of trading activity. This makes the measurement of activity and liquidity challenging when splitting the issues into finer subgroups. While we initially
Figure 4 Groups of issuers
The figure gives an overview of the groups and sub-groups of issuers we are looking at in the analysis. Figure 4 gives an overview of the main issuer groups we ended up looking at that contains enough observations to construct statistics. All the results in the rest of the analysis will be presented separately for these groups. At the general level, we split the issues into government issues and corporate issues. The government issues is further split into securities issued by central-and local government. The corporate group is split into bank issues, covered bonds (OMF) and securities issued by non-financials. We also attempted to split financials into banks and non-banks, but the non-bank group contained too few observations.
Government
Results
Activity measures
We start by calculating various measures of trading activity to examine the basis for our liquidity measures in the subsequent subsections.
Number of days traded
To get an overall view of the number of securities (unique ISINs) in the dataset, Panel A of Figure 5 shows the quarterly time series of total number of listed issues for the different subgroups shown in Figure 4 . Looking first at the government securities, we see that there has been a significant decline in number of local government securities over the sample period. For issues by central government, there has also been a decline. For corporate issues on the other hand there has been a steady increase in number of issues over the period. In particular the number of bank issues have more than doubled over the period, although there was been a 15 We have also looked at short term notes with maturity less than one year at issuance and bonds (time to maturity greater or equal to one year at issuance). The activity in the short term notes were so small and variable that we have not looked separately at the short term notes in the analysis. Consequently, we use data for all issues, which include the short term ones. The additional results can be obtained on request to the authors. decline during 2011. The increase in bank issues from 2005 corresponds to a period of increased credit growth, and increase in wholesale funding for Norwegian banks due to a decrease in the deposit-to-loan ratio. For non-financial issuers there has also been an increasing trend over the sample period. Finally, after the covered bond legislation was adopted in June 2007, we see the growth in number of covered bonds issues by specialized mortgage credit institutions. 16 In Panel B of Figure 5 we show the fraction of the listed issues for which there is at least one transaction during the quarter. Hence, for each quarter any security that has a positive trading volume on any given day is counted as being traded for that quarter. Looking first at the government securities, we see that there has been an increased trading activity in both for central-and local bond issues. Note however that the fraction for central government issues is inflated by repo transactions as we are unable to separate those out. For corporate issues we see that there is a relatively high fraction of the issues that are traded at least once each quarter.
However, these fractions drop dramatically if we increase the frequency to e.g. the monthly or weekly frequency. Furthermore, even at the quarterly frequency, for e.g. bank bonds, at the end of the sample there is about 20% of the issues that are not traded at all on a quarterly basis. For covered bonds we see that there is a significant drop in number of issues that were traded each quarter. One explanation for this sharp drop in trading activity in covered bonds from the end of 2008 through 2009 is the covered bond swap facility set up during the financial crisis.
Next, we examine how frequently individual issues are traded within each quarter. To measure this, we count the number of non-zero trading volume days for each issue within each quarter, and then take the average across all issues for each quarter. Note that when calculating this average, we include all issues, also those that are listed (i.e. not matured), but not traded, during the quarter. Panel A of figure 6 shows the average number of days traded for government bonds (left figure), and corporate issues (right figure) . Looking first at the government securities we see that issues by central government is significantly more frequently traded compared to local government securities. For both groups, there has been an increase in trading frequency through the sample period with central government securities reaching an average of about 45 days on average per security in the fourth quarter of 2011, while for local government issues, the average number of days traded is only about 2.5 days per quarter. Again, the higher trading frequency for central government bonds are affected by the inclusion of repurchase agreements (repos). In the right figure of panel A we show the same statistics for the three groups of corporate issuers. For all groups, we see that the average number of days traded per quarter is on average around 4 days over the period, without any clear trends. Thus, while we in Figure   5 observed a relatively high fraction of securities that is traded each quarter, the statistics on the average number of days traded per security suggest that they, at the individual level, are traded very infrequently.
In panel B of Figure 6 , we show the total number of listed issues that are traded at least 16 A commercial bank or a savings bank is not allowed to issue such bonds in its own name, but may establish a mortgage credit institution as a subsidiary. Alternatively, a mortgage credit institution may be established as an independent institution with several shareholders. In panel B of Figure 7 , we look at the average trading volume across ISINs for each quarter.
For government securities, we see that the average trading volume has increased significantly for bonds issued by local government during 2011. This corresponds to the increased aggregate volume for local government bonds in Panel A, which indicate that there are a fewer, but larger issues. For the corporate issues, we see that the average trading volume for covered bonds is much larger than for bank bonds or bonds issued by non-financials. This is most likely due to large issue size of the covered bonds.
Turnover
Since the previous activity measures do not say anything about how much of the outstanding volume is changing hands on average, it is also useful to calculate the average turnover relative to the outstanding volume of the individual bonds at each point in time. 18 Figure 8 (a) shows the average quarterly turnover for government issues, and part (b) shows the turnover for corporate issues. Looking first at the government securities, we see that the central government issues have a significantly higher turnover that local government securities. This is caused by the 17 For banks, we observe that there is a sharp drop in number of issues traded in the second quarter of 2011. We have not identified any errors in the data. One explanation could be the drop in listed bank securities in the same quarter that we observed in panel B of figure 5. Hence, if many of the most actively traded bank bonds matured during the same quarter, that could explain the spike. 18 We calculate turnover velocity as the transaction volume in NOK divided by the quarter divided by the nominal outstanding NOK volume at the beginning of the quarter. issues, there is no particular trend, except that there is a high, and increasing, variation in turnover over the sample period. The turnover numbers are very noisy given the low number of days traded for the individual issues each quarter (as shown in figure 6 ). In addition, these numbers are affected by the changing composition of bonds and the size of new issues over the period.
Liquidity measures
As discussed earlier, it is useful to distinguish between liquidity measures that are based on the actual trade executions and prices and measures that are based on order information. We will next look at two liquidity measures that we are able to calculate using the available data. The first is a trade based measure (the Amihud illiquidity ratio) and the second measure is an order based measure (the bid ask spread).
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (ILR)
The Amihud illiquidity ratio (ILR) is aimed at measuring how much prices move as response to one currency unit of trade. Securities for which the price move more as response to trades are considered less liquid as the average price impact per currency unit is larger. As mentioned earlier, the calculation of ILR is less data intensive compared to what is required to calculate the bid ask spread. Also, the ILR is potentially more informative since it is a trade-based measure that does not rely on posted limit orders/quotes, but only that all actual trades that are reported to the exchange. Hence we do not need to restrict the calculation to only trades that are done in the Oslo Stock Exchange system. We calculate the ILR as defined in equation 1 based on Amihud (2002) . Hence, for each issue we calculate the total NOK volume and absolute return over each quarter. Then, for each quarter we take the equally weighted average ILR across all issues to construct the quarterly time series for each group. Panel A of Figure   9 shows the average quarterly Amihud illiquidity ratio (ILR) calculated for government issues 
Relative bid ask spread
The next liquidity measure we calculate is the relative bid ask spread as defined in equation (2). This is a measure within the class of order based measures, as defined by Aitken and ComertonForde (2003) . In an active limit order market or in a market with many competing market makers, the spread is a measure of the cost required to supply liquidity. Note that to calculate the spread, we need there to be both a bid and ask quote for the same day for a security. Given the market structure at the fixed income market at the Oslo Stock Exchange, it is essentially only for government securities that there is a continuous market with designated market makers (primary dealers) required to quote bid and ask prices as well as orders from other participants.
For corporate bonds, there is an opening and close auction similar to equities, and order entering and manual trade reports. For the Oslo ABM segment there is order entering and manual trade reporting, but without any opening or closing auction. As opposed to government securities, there are no designated market makers in corporate bonds.
In Figure 10 (a) we show the equally weighted average relative bid ask spread (in % of the midpoint price) for government issues, bank issues and covered bonds. These are the only groups that we were able to calculate spreads for. Part (b) of the figure shows the number of quarterly observations underlying each of the series. Looking first at figure (b) we clearly do not have enough observations to put any weight on these spread estimates. The only series that have a reasonable number of two sided quote observations is the one for government bonds due to the primary dealers responsibility to quote bid and ask prices. For the bank issues, there is until 2008 a few ISINs with two sided quotes, however, after 2008 there are none. For comparison, we also include covered bonds for which there are only a few quarters that there are two sided quotes for a few of the issues.
Figure 10
Relative bid ask spread Panel (a) shows the equally weighted average relative bid ask spread for government bonds, bank bonds and covered bonds in percent of the midpoint price. Note that the series for banks stops in the third quarter of 2008 due to lack of two sided bid ask quotes in the OBI data. Panel (b) shows the corresponding number of observations underlying the different series. These patterns largely coincide with what we observe for measures of equity market liquidity, analyzed in Naes et al. (2008) . Furthermore, in Naes et al. (2008) they also observe that while all stocks become more illiquid during periods of stress, smaller stocks become relatively more illiquid than larger stocks. However, looking at the number of unique ISINs in part (b) of the figure, suggest that the sample size is too small to interpret these series any further.
Interestingly, the few points of covered bond spread estimates suggest that they are close to what we observe for bank issues. Overall, due to the low activity and market structure of fixed income trading in Norway, the bid ask spread is not very informative measure of liquidity due to the lack of two sided quotes being reported. As discussed in the introduction, there are alternative estimators that can be used to estimate an implicit spread based on prices and not actual bid ask quotes such as e.g. the Roll (1984) estimator or the Lesmond et al. (1999) estimator.
However, these still require there to be a reasonable level of trading activity for each individual security to be estimated reliably, which is not the case for the Norwegian market. 19
Summary and conclusion
In this analysis we use the complete database of registered transactions in fixed income securities listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) for the period 1999 through 2011. The main purpose of the project has been to assess whether there is sufficient activity to construct liquidity indicators that can be used to monitor the state of the Norwegian fixed income market on a regular basis based on the OBI database.
At the aggregate level, the trading activity and volume has increased over the sample period.
However, this has to a large degree been driven by an increased trading activity in government securities up to 2008, with a decline in activity in the period after 2008. For corporate bonds, there has also been an increase in overall activity. This increase has been accompanied by doubling of the number of corporate bond issues over the sample period. However, when we split the sample subgroups of government and corporate issues, and look at the intensity that the securities are traded within each quarter, we find these number to be very low. In particular for corporate issues, we find that securities are traded on average 4 days per quarter which means that there is a large number of issues that are not traded on a quarterly basis.
With the low trading activity, any statistical measure that attempt to measure liquidity would be highly unreliable and would in most cases not give an accurate picture of the actual liquidity supply. We attempt to calculate an order based measure (bid ask spread), but find that this is particularly difficult to measure for corporate securities as there are very few two sided quote observations. This is mainly due to the low trading activity in corporate bonds and the fact that most trading is conducted over the counter (OTC). For corporate bonds there is not enough observations to calculate the spread series after 2008. For the government securities on the other hand, there are enough two sided quote observations to produce the spread series throughout the sample period, and we see that the spread series increases during the major stress periods in our sample.
Due to the reporting rules at the Oslo Stock Exchange, where all OTC transactions shall be reported to the exchange at least by the end of the trading day, trade-based liquidity measure are more representative measures of liquidity of the Norwegian market. The Amihud Illiquidity ratio (ILR) is such a trade based measure, and is calculated using the total volume transacted both on-and off-market. Due to this, the ILR measure is superior to order-based measures when it comes to measuring liquidity of the Norwegian fixed income market. The low trading activity in individual securities, however, makes it problematic to perform a a more detailed cross-sectional analysis across finer groups of issuers and across various securities characteristics.
B Market structure -TradElect
In general, the market structure in TradElect consists of four levels (shown in figure 11 ). The Market defines the geographical elements of the trading environment; e.g. business calendar and time zone. A market may have many segments connected to it. Oslo Børs' trading will be in the market "OB". A Segment is a set of sectors where common features apply to the securities; e.g. tick size and other high level specifications of the trading model. A Sector is a set of securities with common behavior; e.g. price monitoring thresholds. A Security is the tradable instrument. The segments and sectors details are provided in figure 12. 
